Followers of Burma's travails in recent years will not have been surprised by the main findings in the report-sanctions against the generals have produced little in the way of tangible benefits, it concluded, and may have even delayed prospects for improving human rights and democracy in Burma.

As Joakim Kreutz, a political scientist from the University of
Uppsala, put it in his testimony to the report's producers: "Unfortunately, they [sanctions] are not being effective because China, India and Thailand especially are very interested in interacting with Burma."

So where do we go from here? Unfortunately the document is less clear on a possible way forward. It recommends, following the testimony of Derek Tonkin, the former British ambassador to Thailand, that "the [British] government and the EU should give more weight to the views of those who are critical of sanctions on Burma." It also proposes that the EU examine possibilities for increasing the welfare of ordinary Burmese who may have been adversely affected by sanctions. Significantly, London is asked to perform "an urgent enquiry into sanctions policy on Burma with a view to deciding whether it is worth continuing with it."

The message here is clear. As some of the contributors to the report, including Tonkin, have suggested, the Burma sanctions debate has in recent years been stifled by lobby groups who have been more intent on embarrassing and punishing the regime than actually producing pragmatic
solutions designed to better the situation in Burma. Governments-notably the US and UK-have listened to these groups, although London and Washington have
effectively admitted in recent years that sanctions have achieved few, if any, benefits. The US State Department, for instance, has said on the record that sanctions on Burma are now considered to be little more than symbolic. Perhaps the average Burmese person appreciates a principled stance against its illegitimate and draconian government, but presumably a policy that actually
produces some kind of results would be preferred.

Furthermore, the report concludes that by acknowledging the ineffectiveness of the current measures, the UK government has undermined its own stated desire that sanctions should "have clear objectives, including
well-defined and realistic demands against which compliance can be judged, and a clear exit strategy."

Some may argue here that sanctions have been unsuccessful because they have not been strong enough and should therefore be ratcheted up, as came out in the report. However, the document already acknowledges that EU sanctions are fairly comprehensive in that they ban the sale of arms, equipment for "internal repression," freeze the funds and economic resources of Burmese
government officials and restrict the admission to the EU of junta personnel, among other measures. Would even stricter US and EU sanctions fair any better in the absence of support from the UN and Burma's neighbors, a possibility
described as highly improbable by a number of sources, including the UK government? Probably not, but this is one of the many possibilities that must be discussed.

As the European Commission acknowledged to the UK House of Lords, today's report should be a spur for re-examination of the sanctions question and how it fits into the international community's stance on Burma. More than
anything the document identifies the extent to which a more innovative, thoughtful and pragmatic attitude is required if the West is ever to produce a response to Burma that creates a positive influence.

Supporters of sanctions have in the past argued that any softening of the approach effectively rewards the regime when no progress has been made.

This of course would be unfortunate, but whatever the solution, there has to be an approach that does not automatically push the regime into the arms of the
likes of China and allow the government to easily identify the west as an enemy.

The current sanctions have made it very easy for the government to hold the West and the National League for Democracy responsible for Burma's economic failings. Whether this is accurate or not is neither here nor
there-the truth is that if you ask a Burmese person inside the country whether they agree with economic sanctions or not, most will tell you they do not. An even greater percentage of Burmese will say they disagree with a tourism boycott, yet the UK government's policy of discouraging tourists to Burma is largely driven by lobby groups whose members have done little more than pop
across the border. Would it not be better for these groups, that say they support democracy in Burma, to actually ask ordinary people in the country their views on a tourism boycott-people in Mandalay, Rangoon and Bago and as
well as those in lesser travelled areas along the border?

As Voices of Burma, a non-governmental organization that focuses on Burma tourism, says in the House of Lord's report, these issues require a rejection of simple black and white perspectives on Burma that thus far have
achieved very little. At this stage we have very few answers, the question is-will stakeholders in the Burma conundrum be allowed the space to find any?

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Reporting by Clive Parker-a freelance journalist based in Chiang Mai, Thailand.